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FREEDOM OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
AND THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
MUTSuo NAKAMURA*

I
INTRODUCTION

This article examines the basis and scope of the 1947 Constitution's
guarantee of freedom of economic activities. That freedom encompasses an
individual's right to choose his occupation and residence and to own or hold
property. The article begins by identifying two possible theoretical
foundations of the freedom of economic activities. It then discusses the
specific constitutional provisions which protect that freedom. Finally, the
article examines the constitutional validity of statutory attempts to restrict the
freedom of economic activities.
II
THE SITUATION OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEM

A.

The Situation of Economic Freedom within Human Rights

Within Japanese constitutional theory, freedom of economic activities is
classified as one of the rights to freedom, such as freedom of mental activities
and freedom from bondage, as distinguished from social rights, such as the
right to a decent life, the right to receive an education, the right to work, and
the fundamental rights of workers as they emerged in the welfare state in this
century.' In this context, freedom of economic activities is the individual's
right to reject interference by the state. On the other hand, an influential
Copyright © 1990 by Law and Contemporary Problems

* Professor, Faculty of Law, Hokkaido University. The author and the editors are grateful to
Hiroyuki Yuzuriha for his careful translation of this article from Japanese to English.
1. For the various social rights, see 1947 Const. arts. 25-28. For a commentary distinguishing
the social rights and rights to freedom, see M. NAKAMURA, SHAKAIKEN NO KAISHYAKU 2 (1983).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 53: No. 2

theory combines freedom of economic activities with the social rights of
Articles 25 through 28 into a new concept of "fundamental social rights,"
distinct from the fundamental rights of individuals. 2 This theory emphasizes
the social character of citizens' obligations rather than the individual's right to
freedom of economic activities.
B.

What Kinds of Human Rights Inhere in Freedom of Economic
Activities?

Articles 22 and 29 of the 1947 Constitution guarantee freedom of
economic activities. Article 22 provides freedom to change a residence and
freedom to choose an occupation. 3 Article 29 provides for the right to
4
property.
Freedom to choose an occupation is a component of economic freedom.
Furthermore, it is argued that occupational freedom has an aspect of human
dignity, or the right to personhood. The Supreme Court of Japan has held
that cccupational freedom is closely connected to the value of individual
personhood. 5 The Court 6 and a dominant theory7 acknowledge that the
freedom to choose an occupation also includes the freedom to conduct
business.
A popular point of view classifies freedom to change one's residence as
part of the freedom of economic activities because both freedoms are
provided for in the same Article of the 1947 Constitution. Further, modern
capitalist society has developed on the premise that guaranteeing free
movement of individuals frees the working class. 8 On the other hand, some
theories insist that residential freedom is related to the right to be free from
any form of bondage 9 or to the right to freedom of mental activities,' 0 since
there is a difference in nature between the freedom to change one's residence
and the freedom to choose an occupation. These theories suggest that
residential freedom might be composed of several rights such as freedom
2. N. UKAI, SHINBAN KENPO 79-80 (1968). Professor Naoki Kobayashi distinguishes "rights to
freedom" and "social-economical rights," and the freedom of economic activities is classified as one
of the social-economical rights. This classification is adequate to understand the character and
history of the right to freedom of economic activity. N. KOBAYASHI, KENP6 KOHGi 273 (1980).
3. Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his
occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare. Freedom of all
persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of their nationality shall be
inviolate.
1947 CONST. art. 22.
4. The right to own or to hold property is inviolable. Property rights shall be defined by
law, in conformity with the public welfare. Private property may be taken for public use
upon just compensation therefore.
Id. art. 29.
5. Umehara v. Japan (The Pharmacy Case), 29 Minshfi 572 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 30, 1975).
6. 26 Keishfi 586 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 22, 1972).
7. See, e.g., N. KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 512; 2 T. MIYAZAWA, KENP6 391 (1972).
8. See, e.g., M. ITOH, KENPOH 337 (1982); I. SATOH, NIHONKOKU KENPO GAISETU 213 (3d ed.
1985).
9. T. KAKUDOH, KENP6H 239 (1982).

10.

K.

SATOH,

KENP6H

375 (1981).
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from bondage, freedom of expression, and freedom as a basis of selffulfillment.
Case law treats residential freedom differently from
occupational freedom.
Generally, the right to property is classified as part of the freedom of
economic activities. According to most scholars, Article 29 of the 1947
Constitution contains aspects of both the guarantee of a private individual's
right to own property and the broader institutional guarantee of property
ownership.
C.

The Nature of Economic Freedom

The human rights provisions of the 1947 Constitution, especially Articles
12 and 13, which provide the general principles, assume civil liberties to be
limited by the public welfare. The protection of freedoms contained in
Articles 22 and 29 is also limited by the public welfare. Most opinions say that
the public welfare limits the freedom of economic activities more than it limits
civil liberties, such as freedom of mental activities or freedom from bondage,
because Articles 22 and 29 expressly stipulate the public welfare restriction on
economic activities.
The Japanese judiciary uses the two-tiered test developed in the United
States to review the constitutionality of statutes. Applying the strict scrutiny
test, the court presumes that statutes that regulate freedom of expression or
freedom of mental activities are unconstitutional. The court seems to apply
the rational relation test, which involves a lower standard of scrutiny, to
statutes restricting freedom of economic activities in order to allow the
legislature discretion in this area.
The Supreme Court ofJapan accepted the two-tiered test for the first time
12
on November 22, 1972, in a case involving the licensing of a retail business.
In the Pharmaceutical Business Act case of April 30, 1975,1 3 the Court more
clearly applied the two-tiered test and said:
One's occupation inevitably has a close relation to social and economic policy. Thus,
freedom to choose an occupation may be regulated to a greater extent than freedom
of mental activities. For this reason Article 22, section 1, emphasizes the sentence "to
the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare."

The Court judged occupational freedom to be a type of freedom of economic
activity and recognized that occupations greatly influence society. It
concluded that freedom to choose an occupation should be subject to broader
restrictions than freedom of mental activities, and that Article 22, section 1,
should be interpreted accordingly.

II.

M. ITOH, supra note 8, at 338-40.

12.
13.

26 Keish6 586.
29 Minsh3 572.
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III
FREEDOM OF OCCUPATION

A.

Early Decisions

In the early period after the 1947 Constitution went into effect, the
Supreme Court applied the "public welfare" test to decide the
constitutionality of statutes restricting the freedom to choose an occupation.
1. Occupation Stability Act. Among the early Supreme Court decisions, one
of the leading cases that allowed limitations on the freedom to choose an
occupation was the Grand Bench decision of June 21, 1950,14 holding
constitutional the challenged provision of the Occupation Stability Act
(Shokugy6 Antei H6). This decision judged the purpose of the Act as "giving
each person a certain occupation suitable for one's ability and planning a
stable employment," and concluded that the purpose was reasonable. But
legal scholars have criticized the Court's inadequate review of whether such a
strict limitation was proper. In other words, in judging the constitutionality of
statutes that limit the freedom to choose an occupation, the Court, it is
argued, should first review the purpose of the limitation and, second,
determine whether the means of limitation are proper. These scholars argue,
however, that in its early decisions the Court did not adequately recognize the
need to decide whether the means of the limitation itself were proper or
improper, even if the limitation's purpose was reasonable.' 5
2. Antique DealingAct. The Supreme Court Grand Bench decision of March
18, 1953,16 addressed the constitutionality of the Antique Dealing Act
(Kobutu Eigy6 H6), which prohibited antique dealing without a license. The
Court held that the statute was constitutional since Article 22 of the 1947
Constitution allows "public welfare" limitations on the freedom to choose an
occupation. As a general rule, the Court noted that "if the Antique Dealing
Act adopts the licensing system and if punishing non-licensed businesses is
necessary to maintain public welfare, the limitation is constitutional." The
Court then decided that the licensing system in antique dealing is "necessary
to maintain the public welfare, to protect victims, to prevent crimes, to aid in
the arrest of criminals, and to [preserve] national . . . well-being." This
decision adopted the "necessary restriction" standard and operates as the
leading case upholding statutes limiting the freedom to choose an
occupation.' 7 Other Supreme Court Grand Bench decisions that adopt the
"necessary restriction" test are as follows: the decision upholding the
constitutionality of the Drug Control Act (Mayaku Torishimari H6), which
prohibits the delivery, receipt, and keeping of drugs;' 8 the decision upholding
14.
15.

4 Keish6i 1049 (Sup. Ct., G.B., June 21, 1950).
Okudaira, Eigyj no]Jiyl no Kisei, in BESSATU JURIST ZOKU HANREI TENBOH 19 (1973).

16.

7 Keishii 577 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Mar. 18, 1953).

17.

Ashibe, Syohugyd no jiyzi no Kisei, 294 H6GAKU SEMINAR 54 (1979).

18.

10 Keishfi 1746 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 26, 1956).
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the constitutionality of Article 17 of the Dentist Act (Shika ishi H6) and Article
20 of the Dental Technician Act (Shika gik6shi H6), which prohibit dental
technicians from checking the line of teeth and from practicing
orthodontics;1 9 the decision upholding the constitutionality of the Massager
Act (Anmashi, Harishi, Kyushi, oyobi Jyud6seihukushi H6), which prohibits
certain businesses from providing services that are similar to medical
treatment; 20 and the decision upholding the constitutionality of Article 5, item
2 of the Unfair Competition Protection Act, which prohibits all businesses
21
from committing intentional acts of unfair competition.
3. Zoning. In the Supreme Court Grand Bench decision of January 26,
1955,22 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a public bath zoning law,
which required a certain distance between existing and newly planned public
bathhouses before the state grants licenses for the new buildings. The
purpose of the statute was to allocate public baths adequately. The Court
characterized the public bath as "a sanitary accommodation that is a
prerequisite in the daily lives of many nationals." The Supreme Court
measured the necessity of public baths and concluded that "many nationals
would suffer daily inconvenience with few public baths. And with too many
public baths in competition, the bath business would become economically
unstable. Consequently, the condition of sanitary accommodation would
decline, adversely affecting national health and environmental sanitation."
The point of the Supreme Court's analysis is that if there is no zoning on
public baths, there would be more public baths in competition with one
another. Consequently, the condition of sanitary equipment would decline.
Many commentaries criticize the Supreme Court for failing to review
adequately the legislative facts behind the zoning law and for simply ruling in
accordance with legislative history.
B.

The Supreme Court Grand Bench decision of November 22, 1972

While the earlier cases uniformly applied the public welfare test, the first
case to apply the "purpose" test to decide the constitutionality of a statute
was the Grand Bench decision of November 22, 1972.23 This decision was an

important turning point in the development of the constitutional analysis of
restrictions on the freedom to choose an occupation. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Retail Business Adjustment Special Measure Act
(Kouri Shogyo Chosei Tokubetu Sochi Ho), Article 3, clause 1. This law
zoned retail markets by requiring new markets to be licensed. For the first
time, the Supreme Court classified the restrictions based on the purpose of
the regulated economic activity.
19.
20.
21.
22.
1955).
23.

13 Keishf6 1132 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 8, 1959).
14 Keish6i 33 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,Jan. 27, 1960).
14 Keishfi 525 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 6, 1960).
Shimizu v. Japan (The Fukuoka Bathhouse Case), 9 Keishfi 89 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Jan. 26,
26 Keishii 586.
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Under this new test, the Supreme Court divides occupational restrictions
into two categories based on their purposes. The first type of restriction is
negative, designed to keep public safety and order; the other is an affirmative
restriction aimed at carrying out socioeconomic policy under the ideal of a
welfare state. As to the affirmative restriction, the Supreme Court, respecting
legislative discretion, adopted what is called the "clarity test." Under the
clarity test, the restriction is deemed unconstitutional if the legislative branch
abuses its discretion and the restriction is clearly unreasonable. In the case of
the Retail Business Adjustment Special Measure Act, the Court recognized
that an affirmative restriction protecting small or medium-sized enterprises
has a reasonable purpose in protecting retailers from economic collapse
caused by excess numbers of retail markets, and is, therefore, constitutional.
C.

The Supreme Court Grand Bench Decision of April 30, 1975

In examining the constitutionality of zoning new pharmacies under the
Pharmaceutical Business Act (Yakuji H6), the Supreme Court fundamentally
adopted the reasoning of its 1972 decision, 24 classified the act as a negative
purpose restriction, and held the Pharmaceutical
Business Act
unconstitutional by applying "the strict-reasonableness test," rather than the
clarity test.
At first, the Supreme Court classified two types of measures: affirmative
measures that promote socioeconomic policy and negative measures that
protect the public from the harmful effects of free occupational activities. In
the case of negative purpose restrictions, the Court required the legislative
purpose (i) to be necessary and reasonable and (ii) to impose minimal
restrictions on occupational activity. Next, the Supreme Court reviewed the
necessity and reasonableness of zoning pharmacies and found that zoning a
new pharmacy is a negative purpose measure, designed mainly to protect life
and health from danger. The Court denied the necessity and reasonableness
of distance restrictions in setting up new pharmacies and indicated that the
"danger of supplying defective medicine caused by a sudden increase in
competition or instability of business is not recognized as a reasonable
decision, and is merely speculative." The Court held that the legislature's
argument that business instability leads to a "supply of defective medicine is
unreasonable." Thus, this decision refutes the legislature's logic of causation
in adopting the distance restriction in its 1963 revision of the Pharmaceutical
Business Act.
D.

The Relationship between the Public Bathhouse Decision and the
Pharmaceutical Business Act Decision

On one hand, the Supreme Court decided that the zoning of public baths
is constitutional, and thus affirmed the legislative findings in 1955 that,
without zoning, too many public bathhouses would compete with one another
24.

29 Minshfi 572.
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and the condition of sanitary equipment would decline. On the other hand, in
1975, the Court decided that the zoning of pharmacies is unconstitutional,
and thus denied the legislative findings that without zoning in this context, the
competition among pharmacies would create instability and consequently

defective medicine would be supplied. Therefore, the question arises whether
the decision in 1975 substantially overruled the decision of 1955.
There are two lines of commentary on the issue. 2 5 On the one hand, there
are three arguments denying the constitutionality of the public bathhouse
restrictions. First, there is no causation between laissez-faire policy and the
declining condition of sanitary equipment; rather, free competition increases
sanitation standards. Second, administrative acts controlling public health
and cancelling public bath permits should be done in response to decreasing
sanitation. Third, free competition makes public baths geographically well
apportioned.
On the other hand, the argument that the restrictions are constitutional is
based on the special public character of public bathhouses. First, the public
bath is public insofar as it is a prerequisite of daily life for persons not having
a bath in their own house. Second, the bath charge is regulated and kept low
by the Price Control Order (Bukka T6sei Rei). Third, there is no strategic
flexibility in the public bath business since the demand is regionally restricted.
Fourth, although the cost of constructing baths is high, public bathhouse
buildings cannot be converted to serve other industries.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision of 1955 and held that the
zoning of public baths is constitutional.2 6 This decision mentioned the
"public bath as a prerequisite public accommodation in the daily lives of
citizens." The Court judged the purposes of zoning to be "maintaining the
health of the citizens, protecting public bath managers from giving up or
changing businesses because of difficulties, and encouraging a good and
stable business for the 'public welfare.' "
The Court also classified zoning on public bathhouses as "an affirmative
restriction." Citing the Supreme Court decision of November 22, 1972, the
Court mentioned that "if the legislature's act deviates in its discretion and is
clearly unreasonable, the act should be unconstitutional." The Court then
applied the clarity test as a liberal standard of constitutional review. Since
planning to ensure the stability of already existing public baths is an
affirmative purpose restriction, the prevailing position among legal scholars is
27
that zoning on public bathhouses is constitutional.

25.
SEMINAR

See, e.g., N. ASHIBE, KENPOH 3, 66-67 (1981); Ashibe, ShyokugydnoJiyzi no Kisei, 296 H6GAKU

30 (1979).

26. 1302 HanreiJih6 159 (Sup. Ct., 2d P.B.,Jan. 20, 1989).
27. Harada, Ktisyu Yokujjh6 2jyo 2 kou, Osakahu Kjsyuyokujdh5 Sekoujyorei no Kakukitei to Kenpoh 2 jy6
I kou, 934 JURIST 98 (1989).
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IV
PROPERTY RIGHTS

A.

The Supreme Court Grand Bench Decision of April 22, 1987

The Supreme Court distinguished between affirmative and negative
restrictions in reviewing the constitutionality of statutes restricting freedom to
choose an occupation. The Court then applied the clarity test to affirmative
restrictions and the "strict reasonableness" test, which reviews the
reasonableness of legislative discretion, to negative restrictions. The question
arises whether this dichotomy between the affirmative and negative
restrictions also applies to property rights cases. Scholars generally assert
28
that the dichotomy applies to property rights as well.

The Supreme Court decision of April 22, 1987,29 clarified the test for
reviewing statutes restricting property rights. This decision, concerning the
right to claim division of joint ownership as prescribed by Civil Code (Minp6)
Article 256, clause 1, dealt with the constitutionality of the Forest Act (Shinrin
H6),30 which denied this right to persons owning less than half of a forest.
The decision declared the Forest Act, Article 186, to be unconstitutional as a
violation of Article 29, clause 2.
The majority opinion, citing the Pharmaceutical Business Act case of 1975,
first stated that the purpose of regulating property rights varies from
"affirmative restriction[s] on socioeconomic policy such as vindication for
public accommodation or protection for [an] economically weak person" to
"negative restriction[s] on behalf of security of social life or maintenance of
public order." The question of whether the restriction fits the public welfare
limitation in Article 29, clause 2, of the 1947 Constitution should be decided
by balancing the purpose, necessity, and content of the restriction. The
Supreme Court, however, decided that
[t]he legislature's balancing should be respected. But, where it is clear that the
restrictive purpose is not consistent with public welfare, or where, even if the
restrictive purpose comports with public welfare, the measures of restriction are
unnecessary or unreasonable in accomplishing its purpose, the restrictive statute
should be construed as against Article 29, clause 2, of the 1947 Constitution. Thus,
the decision of the legislature should be denied only when it exceeds the reasonable
31
use of discretion.

Next, the majority opinion, applying the test to Article 186 of the Forest
Act, reviewed the constitutionality of both the Act's purpose and manner.
First, the Supreme Court explained that the legislative purposes of Article 186
are "protecting the stability of forest management and consequently
promoting the culture and the production capacity of the forest." The court
then decided that these legislative purposes were constitutional since it
28. See, e.g., Y. HIGUCHI, I. SATOH, M. NAKAMURA & N. URABE, CYiUSYAKU NIHONKOKU KENPOH
679 (1984); I. SATOH, KENP6 482 (1983); 1 N. URABE, KENPOHGAKU Ky6SHrrU 260-61 (1988).
29. Hiraguchi v. Hiraguchi, 41 Minshu 408 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 22, 1987).
30. InJapan, community residents in rural areas may own a forest through a form of ownership
that Americans might describe as tenancy in common.
31. 41 Minshfi 408.
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cannot be clearly argued that public welfare is not involved. Next, the Court
examined the manner of the restriction from several angles and decided that
the legislative decision to deny the right to claim division ofjoint ownership is
beyond the legislature's reasonable discretion in relation to the legislative
purpose of Article 186. Since the Court did not find both reasonableness and
necessity, it held Article 186 to be unconstitutional.
In addition to the majority opinion of the twelve justices, a minority
opinion of three justices clearly adopts the dichotomy between affirmative and
negative restrictions. The minority applied the clarity test to the affirmative
restriction but reached different results. Justice Ohuchi decided that the
restriction was unconstitutional, but Justice Kagawa held it to be
constitutional.
Thus, the majority opinion did not necessarily decide that Article 186 was
unconstitutional by defining which test would be applied to statutes
restricting property rights. Consequently, legal scholars are divided over the
interpretation of this case. In his commentaries, Professor Ashibe has
32
identified three groups in this debate.
The first group interprets this Supreme Court decision as applying the
strict reasonableness test of the Pharmaceutical Business Act case in 1975.
The 1987 decision interprets legislative purpose as maintaining the status quo
even if the act has an economic purpose. Thus the Forest Act was not decided
under the dichotomy of affirmative and negative restrictions. 33
The second group says that the Supreme Court did not adopt the
dichotomy of affirmative and negative restrictions on property rights. 34 In the
case of environmental protection, for example, these commentators recognize
the difficulty in deciding whether the restriction has an affirmative or a
negative purpose. This group takes a position against applying the dichotomy
to freedom to choose an occupation and posits that the constitutionality of
statutes restricting freedom to choose an occupation and property rights are
decided basically by the reasonableness test. In determining the
"reasonableness" of a measure, a court should examine legislative facts.
The third group views the dichotomy as a more objective analysis and
interprets the Forest Act decision as determining constitutionality by
balancing. 35 According to this group, the dichotomy is not applied in the
property right context.
In any event, understanding the relationships among the decisions of
1972, 1975, and 1987, which indicate the tests to determine the
32.

Ashibe, Kenpch Hanrei no Ddk6 to "'Nyino Kiun" no Riron, in H. WADA, KOKI KINEN RONSYU

KENP6GAKU NO TENKAi 274-79 (1988).

33. Id. at 277-78; Imamura, Zaisanken no Hosyc to Shinrinhd, 186 JURIST 70 (1987).
34. Abe, Kyoytirin Bunkatuseigen Ikenhanketu, 59 H6RITUJIH6 183 (1987); Tonami, ShokugyjnoJiyi,
in KENP6H NO KiHON MONDAI 245 (N. Ashibe ed. 1988); Yonezawa, Shinrinhi Ikenhanketu to Saikisai,
83 H6GAKU KYOSHITU 27 (1987).
35. Satoh, Shinrinho Kyoyunin Bunkatuseigen Ikenhanketu to Ikenshinsakipun, 392 H6GAKU SEMINAR 17
(1987).
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constitutionality of restrictions on the freedom to choose an occupation and
on property rights, depends on the development of future cases.
B.

Expropriation and Just Compensation

Article 29, clause 3, of the Constitution provides that private property may
be taken "for public use" with "just compensation." This provision means
that the government may expropriate and restrict private property where
there is a public need, and that just compensation should be paid thereafter.
1. What is 'for Public Use"? "For public use" includes not only public
enterprises, such as roads, railroads, and airports, but also those cases in
which the expropriation is primarily for the public, although specific
individuals may benefit as a result. For example, during the post-World War
II farm reform, which was designed to make farmers independent, the
Japanese Government purchased farms of landowners and sold them to
36
tenant farmers.
2. What is 'Just Compensation"? Legal commentaries on what "just
compensation" means can be classified into three groups. 37 The first group
requires the government to compensate the property owner for all property
damage. For example, when the government expropriates land, it must
compensate individuals for the market value of the land taken. The second
group advocates "probable compensation."
This group defines just
compensation as probable or reasonable compensation calculated by
considering the degree of public need for the restriction on the property right
as well as the surrounding social or economic circumstances. 38 Consequently,
there will be cases where the amount of compensation given is below the
property's market value. The third group defines just compensation
depending on the specific situation. In the case of an expropriation of the
bourgeoisie's property, such as compensation for landowners in farm reform
or compensation for stockholders in nationalizing important industries,
probable compensation is required, but in the case of ordinary expropriation,
39
full compensation is required.
The Supreme Court Grand Bench decision of December 23, 1953, held
that just compensation, as prescribed by Article 29, clause 3, of the 1947
Constitution, is "the probable amount reasonably calculated by the probable
economic value at that time." 40 The Court then decided that the payment
offered by the government was constitutional under the theory of probable
36.
37.
38.

7 Minshfi 1523 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 23, 1953).
See Y. HIGUCHI, I. SATOH, M. NAKAMURA & N. URABE, supra note 28, at 689-90.
I. SATOH, supra note 8, at 226.

39.

See S. IMAMURA, SONSHITUHOSY6SEIDO NO KENKYU 74 (1967).

40.

7 Minshfi 1523.

CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN:

For an English translation of this decision, see J. MAKI, COURT AND
SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 1948-60, at 230 (1964).
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compensation. The Supreme Court First Bench decision of October 18,
1973, 4 1 however, required whole compensation and held that
since compensation for damage prescribed by the Land Expropriation Act (Tochi
Sy~iy6 H6) seeks to compensate for specific sacrifices of property rights caused by
expropriation for a specific public enterprise, whole compensation, that is,
[compensation] equivalent to the value of expropriated property, must be given.
When compensated with money, the amount of money sufficient to buy substitute land
equal in value to the expropriated land must be required.

The Supreme Court decision seems to follow the position of the third group
as discussed above: In the case of ordinary expropriation, whole
compensation is required, and in the case of infringement of property rights
in the course of social reform, such as farm reform, probable compensation is
required .42

C. Just Compensation and the Right to Standard of Living Compensation
Whole compensation, required in the case of ordinary expropriation of
property, includes incidental costs, such as the cost of moving or damage to
business, in addition to compensation for the fair market value of the
expropriated property. Is this really the meaning of "just compensation," as
whole compensation for the infringement of property rights? For example, in
the case of the expropriation of farmland to build an international airport,
monetary compensation alone is not sufficient, so the question arises whether
the compensation given must restore the person affected to the standard of
living he or she enjoyed before the expropriation. Sample legislation
providing measures to reconstruct the individual lifestyles of those who lost
their standard of living by the expropriation are as follows: the Highway
Constitution for Developing National Land Act of 1957, Article 9 (Kokudo
Kansen Jidoshad6 Kensetu H6), the Specific Measure Acquiring Public Land
Act of 1961, Article 47 (K6ky6 Y6chi no Syutokuni Kansuru Tokubetu Sochi
H6), the Urban Planning Act of 1968, Article 74 (Toshi Keikaku H6), the Biwa
Lake General Development Specific Measure Act of 1972, Article 7 (Biwako
S6g6kaihatu Tokubetu Sochi H6), and the Riverhead Area Specific Measure
Act of 173, Article 8 (Suigen Chiiki Taisaku Tokubetu Sochi H6).
The question is whether these measures for reconstructing standards of
living are required by the Constitution or are simply a matter of legislative
policy. For example, Article 8 of the Riverhead Area Specific Measure Act
provides for reconstructing the lifestyles of those whose standards of living
diminish because of the construction of a dam. A lower court decision holds
that such measures are not included in the definition of "just compensation"
in Article 29, clause 3, of the Constitution and thus are not required by the
Constitution. 43 Scholars argue persuasively, however, that compensation for
a drop in one's standard of living is a requirement of the 1947 Constitution,
as part of the guarantee of the right to a decent life prescribed in Article 25.
41.
42.
43.

27 Minshfi 1210 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Oct. 18, 1973).
S. IMAMURA, JINKEN S6SETU 218 (1980).
966 HanreiJih6 22 (1980).
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V
CONCLUSION

Until now, the Supreme Court of Japan has decided five cases holding
certain laws unconstitutional: the decision of April 30, 1975, which declared
the zoning provision in the Pharmaceutical Business Act as against the
freedom to choose an occupation; the decision of April 22, 1987, which
declared the provision prohibiting a claim to divide a jointly-owned forest as
against the guarantee of property rights; the decision of April 4, 1973, which
declared that Article 200 of the Criminal Code (Keih6) violated the guarantee
of equal protection of law by unconstitutionally imposing heavier penalties for
committing patricide as opposed to regular homicide; and the decisions of
April 14, 1976, and July 17, 1985, which declared unconstitutional the
apportionment provision for representatives in the Election Act (Senkyo H6).
The fact that two of these five decisions relate to the freedom of economic
activity means that the Supreme Court of Japan, while generally exercising
judicial restraint, takes a more active role when deciding issues involving the
freedom of economic activity. The freedom to choose an occupation of
Article 22 and the property rights of Article 29 in the 1947 Constitution are
specifically restricted by public welfare. Under a literal interpretation of the
Constitution, economic freedom is viewed in an inferior position. Economic
freedom, however, seems to be rather heavily guaranteed. In the background
of issuing two decisions finding unconstitutional laws relating to the freedom
of economic activity (as distinct from other constitutional issues), there is
national recognition that the Pharmaceutical Business Act and the Forest Act
were unconstitutional because they had no reasonable basis. The Japanese
Supreme Court is very cautious in deciding constitutional issues without
national consensus.

